Purpose -The economic, political and social significance of housing bubbles is enormous. Since the mid-1980s, the UK housing market has experienced two succeeding bubble-bust cycles, in the periods 1985/6-1989 and 2001/2-2007. These bubbles differed both in length and in how they ended. However, the affordability benchmarks behaved in almost exactly the same way in both cases. The majority of studies identify two ways in which a bubble can end (after the bust 'end regimes'): prices could crash suddenly, in a relatively short period of time or can move in a transition to another regime, such as slow deflation. The aim of this paper is to adjust this theory and to examine whether and why the way a housing bubble stops growing ('growth-end regimes') affects its length, how affordability may be relevant to this and whether housing affordability can guide our investments decisions.
Introduction
It is generally accepted that housing bubbles commonly occur in established residential markets and that their length varies. It is also known that there are two ways that a bubble can end, either in a sudden crash or in a transition to another regime, such as slow deflation. The basic questions that must still be answered are why the way a housing bubble ends (the 'end regime') affects its length, how affordability can be relevant to this and whether housing affordability provides evidence for making investment decisions in the UK housing market.
Our analysis of the UK housing bubbles of the 1980s and 2000s has two aims: the first is to examine their behaviour, in order to determine how similar the two cases are, and the second is to provide an explanation regarding the length and end regime of each. A close examination of historical affordability records has two benefits for UK housing investment. First, higher income households will have more confidence in entering the market if house prices are justified through affordability indices, since if house prices are affordable it is not likely that a crash will ensue. Second, households with very limited income will be able to identify the right time to enter the housing market without fear that their mortgage debts will exceed the real value of their homes, at least in the medium term. Moreover, property appraisers will be able to use the results of this study to offer simple and useful recommendations in terms of property market conditions. In periods of uncertainty, it is claimed that a better understanding of housing bubbles and affordability cycles will allow more investors and homeowners to avoid negative equity and the stress associated with mortgage defaults. The keys to answering the questions set by this paper are the historical records and the theory of housing bubbles and housing cycles itself. Particularly, the methodology centres on cross-case analysis of the last two UK housing bubbles, using research methods such as literature review, historical analysis, regression-correlation analysis, control charts, normality tests and descriptive statistics.
The paper commences with a review of the general theory of housing bubbles. It then seeks to explain whether and to what degree the bubbles of the 1980s and 2000s were similar and why their end regimes affected their length. The consideration of affordability techniques leads to a discussion of the relevance of affordability to bubble length in the UK. The remaining sections examine the significance of the affordability parameter in terms of investment decision-making, with reference to the UK housing market. Barlevy (2007) notes that most economists would find the classical definition of a bubble (an irrational increase in the price of an asset in a short time) to be problematic and ambiguous. It is seen as imprecise because it fails to address core questions such as how much the price must rise or how quickly in order to qualify a situation as a bubble. Similarly, Geraskin and Fantazzini (2011) note that economic literature has no consensus on what a bubble is. Nevertheless, they offer the common example of "an asset whose price rises rapidly, encouraging investors to buy it, even though it is over-valued, because they can turn around and sell it at a higher price than they bought it at". Correspondingly, Stiglitz (1990) offers the following basic definition: "If the reason the price is high today is only because investors believe that the selling price will be high tomorrow-when 'fundamental' factors do not seem to justify such a price-then a bubble exists." Kindleberger (2005) defines a bubble as "any significant increase in the price of an asset or a security or a commodity that cannot be explained by the fundamentals". Similarly, Barlevy (2007) affirms that most economists would define a bubble "as a situation where an asset's price exceeds the fundamental value of the asset". Thus, a simple mathematical expression of an asset price bubble is: P > F , where P denotes the price of the asset and F denotes the fundamental value of the asset.
Definitions of asset bubbles

What creates real estate bubbles-busts?
Muller et al (2009) list the general factors that contribute to the creation of house price bubbles as including changes in demand and in supply, shifts in population trends, growth in the number of households and in GDP, and changes in purchasing power via affordable credit and tax deductions. According to Case and Shiller (2003) , factors contributing to the formation of bubbles on the demand side include demographics, employment and income growth, changes in financing techniques, interest rates and changes in location characteristics, while on the supply side they include building costs, the age of housing inventory and the "industrial organization of the housing market". Allen and Gale (2000) argue that housing bubbles consists of three distinct phases. In phase one, financial liberalization and monetary easing take place and an expansion in credit is accompanied by an increase in the prices of assets such as real estate. This first phase continues for some time, possibly several years, as the bubble inflates, leading to the second phase, when it bursts and asset prices collapse in a short period of time, such as over a few days or weeks, although the collapse may occasionally take longer. The final phase is then characterized by defaults on loans and a banking crisis, which in turn often cause problems in the real sector of the economy for a number of years. This relationship has also been emphasized by Zhou and Sornette (2003) , Gouldey and Thies (2012) and Muller et al (2009) , who argue that a housing bubble is part of a more general credit bubble. In this analysis, a housing bubble cannot exist without the pre-existence of a credit bubble.
Supply inelasticity becomes a crucial determinant of the duration of a bubble. When housing supply is elastic, new construction quickly comes on line as prices rise, which causes the bubble to unravel quickly (Ermisch 1990) . However, Herring and Watcher (2002) note that construction lags contribute to the inelastic supply of real estate as an asset. In the short run, increases in demand together with inelastic supply of housing and developable land cause inventories of for-sale properties to shrink, while vacancy declines and price rises accelerate as a consequence. Once prices overshoot or supply catches up, inventories begin to rise, time on the market increases, vacancy rates rise and price increases slow, eventually encountering downward stickiness (Case and Shiller 2003) . In supporting this view point, Glaeser et al. (2008) state that continuously rising prices reflect a continuously rising housing supply, which means that supply will eventually outstrip current market demand. In such case, due to the weakened demand, prices will then fall and consequently the bubble bursts (Case and Shiller 2003) . When the bubble bursts, housing prices fall below their pre-bubble levels and below what they would have been if the bubble had not happened (Glaeser et al. 2008) . Consequently, the severity of the boom-and-bust cycle has been attributed to developers lagging behind optimum timing, building too late in the boom and continuing to build into the bust (Wheaton and Torto 1988) . Gouldey and Thies (2012) emphasize the exogenous forces that enhance housing demand, such as government initiatives for wider homeownership. This could provide optimal conditions for speculation that further increase demand. Developers and builders can be surprised by the dynamic force of demand and by the number of houses demanded. As a result, builders may begin to build in advance of confirmed demand, in anticipation of a higher arrival rate of new buyers. If developers and builders could predict the demand for houses with accuracy and thus the right number of houses to satisfy demand, no bubble would be created. Therefore, because current or potential demand for housing is not accurately measurable, it could be argued that the housing market is inevitably prone to the formation of bubbles.
The UK housing bubbles of the 1980s and 2000s: Are they similar?
There is an obvious interest in comparing the UK housing bubbles of the 1980s and 2000s. This section aims to determine the level of similarity between these cases by reporting the results of a simple linear regression analysis of five dependent variables to house prices. We also use correlation analysis to assess similarity of performance of the chosen variables compared to house prices in both cases. In this analysis we take the first three years of each case study as a subject for analysis, because the aim is to compare how the variables performed within the bubble period, without taking into account the remaining period of each case or the way they ended. Since the bubbles themselves differed in length, in order to compare like with like it was considered plausible to examine only the first three years in each case, for the purposes of this part of the paper. It should be noted that subsequent sections compare the two cases as a whole. Thus, the overall differences will be examined further.
Datasets
The datasets used in this section are presented in Table 1 in Appendix A. These indices are from the most reliable sources in the UK and provide the longest unbroken series based on the largest sample of data. Datasets 1 to 4, for regression and correlation analysis, use time series from 1986 to 1988 and 2002 to 2004 correspondingly, whereas datasets 5 and 6 run from 1980 to 2010 and are used to enhance the explanation of the comparison parameters. What needs to be clarified is that all the data sets are in nominal values in this paper.
Are they similar? A first look
At first glance, the direction and performance of nominal UK house prices during the first three years of the two cases are almost identical. The average nominal house price during the first three years of the 1980s bubble years is shown by the broken line in Graph 1, corresponding to the right-hand scale, while the equivalent values for the 2000s (left-hand scale) are shown by the solid line. However, house price change cannot be the only parameter examined to determine the degree of similarity between the two housing bubbles. Further analysis is required to examine whether and to what degree the cases are similar. To explore the relationship between housing prices and other fundamental variables, we applied a simple linear regression analysis using house prices as dependent variable and other variables as independent variables. We also performed a correlation analysis using the same variables. The aim was to learn the true relation of the data to the 'bubble environment'. The regression results indicate that the variables of income, unemployment rate and gross lending had a linear relationship to house prices and that the data conform quite well to the discrepancies between actual and predicted price. As a result, the data is fitted extremely well. In particular, income is the most powerful predictor of prices for the 1980s. For the 2000s, unemployment seems to be the strongest predictor of house prices, although income was an almost equally strong predictor. The change in unemployment had a significant and negative effect in both cases. However, the gross lending parameter (£m) can be seen as more explanatory for the 2000s housing bubble, although a minor gap exists when that variable is compared with the 1980s housing bubble. In terms of correlation analysis, these calculations reveal that in both cases the results are almost identical. Again, this shows that the selected variables are highly correlated with house prices and can explain much of the direction in both cases, at least for the selected periods. We conclude that the first three years in both cases are recurrent events. The combination of increasing income, a decline in unemployment rate and particularly the easy access to mortgages and the willingness to lend (at relatively low interest rates) made housing seem more affordable in both cases. As a result, there were dramatic increases in nominal house prices, almost identical in the two cases, at least within the first three years.
The scale of mortgage lending can be considered prima facie (but not decisive) evidence of a housing bubble. Graph 2 shows strong evidence of the price-boosting effect of mortgage loans. Excluding the bubble years shows that the 'normal' number (volume) of loans to homeowners for house purchase was far less than a million per annum, whereas during the bubble years this number increased dramatically to well above a million. The threshold of a million can be considered critical although this conclusion is inefficient since it doesn't take into account the population parameter. Beyond this, the lending behaviour is reflected in housing completions by private enterprises. The theory suggests that supply rises in response to rising demand, which in turn is mirrored in the increase in gross lending. Comparing the figures on Graphs 2 and 3 indicates that the greater the number of loans available, the greater the number of housing completions, since demand increased in line with mortgage lending. This effect is remarkably in the periods 1986-1989 and 2002-2007 . The above analysis shows that the response to the question of whether the 1980s and 2000s bubbles were similar is a straightforward 'yes'. At least for the first three years, the two cases are almost identical in terms of regression variables, while the gross number of loans and housing completions also exhibit strong graphic correlation during these periods. The two bubbles nevertheless differed greatly in terms of their length and the ways in which they ended. These differences will be examined in the following sections. 
Whether and why the way a housing bubble stops growing affects its duration
This section analyses the ways in which the last two UK housing bubbles have stopped growing and the relation of this growth-end regime with overall bubble length. It begins by describing the existing probability theory in terms of the ways in which a housing bubble can end. Then it seeks to adjust and then apply that theory to the parameter of bubble length, with a view to producing a new justified theory.
The probabilities for the direction of housing bubbles
Before answering the questions of whether and why the way a housing bubble ends affects its duration, it is appropriate to outline how the existing basic probability theory can be applied to each possible end regime, after the bust of a bubble. If A is an event, the probability that A will occur can be written as P (A). For example, P (A) ≤ 1 means that the event has a finite probability. On the other hand, P (φ) = 0 denotes an empty or impossible event.
P (A ∪ B) = P (A) + P (B) -P (A ∩ B) where A ∪ B is the event where either A or B occurs and A ∩ B is the event where both A and B occur. If A and B cannot occur simultaneously, we say that A and B are mutually exclusive events. This can be symbolized as A ∩ B = φ , then P (A ∩ B) = 0 (Golberg and Cho 2010) . Therefore, if P (A ∩ B) = 0 , then the two events are mutually exclusive, which means that they have no interaction (Rumsey 2006) . Basically, where the occurrence of one of the events in a set rules out the possibility of the occurrence of the remaining events of the set, then the members of the set are mutually exclusive (Vasishtha and Vasishtha 2008) .
Based on this theory, Case and Shiller (2003) and Zhou and Sornette (2003) state that housing bubbles do not end necessarily in a sudden crash. There is a finite probability that a bubble will instead end in transition to another regime, such as slow deflation. However, these end regimes and their probabilities are applicable to the point after the bust of a bubble (after the lifetime of the bubble). Following this logic, Yan (2011) adds that there is also a finite probability that no crash will occur during the lifetime of the bubble. However, as the main probability theory suggests, these end regimes are mutually exclusive events.
The probabilities of growth-end regimes and the length of housing bubbles
The above theory is fundamental within the field of asset bubbles. In summary, it states that there are two possible ways in which a housing bubble can end: in a sudden crash or in slow deflation. In other words, prices could crash suddenly, in a relatively short period of time or can move in a transition to another regime, such as slow deflation. Additionally, a small probability also exists that no crash will occur during a bubble. In probability theory, these events are considered mutual exclusive. However, these two main regimes of the existing literature are relevant to circumstances in which a bubble has already ended.
Our study relates the existing probability theory of end regimes, relevant to the ex post end of the bubble, to the possible growth-end regimes of bubbles during their lifetime, before the point that denotes the end. For instance, our study considers that during the lifetime of a bubble, there are two main ways in which it can stop growing (i.e. two growth-end-regimes). One is for it to end suddenly as the bubble is swelling exponentially, while the alternative is for it to end in transition to another regime, such as slow disinflation, although there is also a finite probability that no end will occur, as Yan (2011) has noted accordingly above. Therefore this considerationtheory of 'growth end regimes' is based on two assumptions. First, it assumes that the existing end-regime probability theory is applicable to the direction of a bubble during its lifetime, although the existing end-regime theory has been applied to the direction of bubbles after they end. Further to this, we assume that the same possibilities (i.e. sudden end or slow deflation) exist in growth-end regimes case, with the difference that in our case, the (their) opposed mutually exclusive events are the 'sudden ending' to the lifetime of the bubble and slow ''disinflation'' (rather than slow ''deflation'', which is impossible during the lifetime of a bubble, when prices continue to inflate by definition). Deflation is possible only when a bubble has already ended and is not relevant to the consideration of alternative growth-end regimes during the bubble's lifetime (before the point that denotes the end). Instead, 'disinflation' is relevant here and is well captured in Graph 5, as applied to the case of the 2000s. In short, a sudden end and slow disinflation are mutually exclusive growthend regimes for an ongoing bubble, because the occurrence of one rules out the possibility of the simultaneous occurrence of the other.
The growth-end regimes of the last two UK housing bubbles and their effect on length
Graph 4 and Graph 5 show the direction of house prices during the bubble periods of 1986-1990 and 2002-2008 . The broken line denotes the 1980s bubble, while the solid line indicates the equivalent values for the 2000s bubble. It must be clarified that in both graphs and both cases, the last year of the length has been ignored, since 1990 (5 th year in Graphs 4 and 5) and 2008 (7 th year in Graphs 4 and 5) are recorded as being the respective first bust years (for each case), rather than bubble years. As Graph 4 and 5 shows, the first bubble ended in its fourth year (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) , while the second lasted two years longer, ending in its sixth year (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) . Nevertheless, Graph 5 implies that the 1980s housing bubble (the shorter) ended with a sudden crash, while the 2000s bubble (the longer) ended in transition to a slow disinflation regime. In summary, the Graphs 4 and 5 indicate that both of the growth-end regimes are directly related with time. But the questions that remain unanswered are how the growth-end regime affects the length of a bubble, or whether it was by chance that the 1980s bubble was shorter than the 2000s.
Graph 4: UK house price performance (nominal values) during bubble years, 1986 -1990 and 2002 -2008 Graph 5: Percentage change in average house prices during bubble years, 1986-1990 and 2002-2008, 2000s (line) , 1980s (broken line)
What is the critical point and how it measured?
This section extensively uses the term 'critical point', whose meaning in this context must therefore first be clarified. It refers here to the point at which a housing bubble stops growing; in other words, the point at which house prices reach unaffordable levels, so that no further demand or speculation can be sustained, nor can existing demand stimulate house prices any more. This point is measured by using the affordability index of the debt-burden ratio (mortgage costs to income). Although in section 8.0 and 9.0 this point is well measured, justified and specified, we have to make clear that in our theoretical justification, both in Diagram 1.0 in appendix A and in this section, the critical point does not imply a specific value, since the discussion of the relationship in this section is purely theoretical.
A theoretical justification of growth-end regimes
As stated in section 5.3, the 1980s housing bubble ended suddenly and was shorter in duration than the 2000s bubble, whose growth-end regime was one of slow disinflation. Despite the above apparent conclusion, this section seeks to provide a theoretical explanation of the why the way in which a housing bubble is intended to end can affect its length and whether a time lag prevails between the two mutually exclusive events. The theoretical analysis is limited to two principal areas, viz. the way in which house prices are inflated (i.e. exponential inflation or disinflation) and the way in which interest rates are increased (i.e. suddenly and on a large scale, or gradually and on a small scale). Previous relevant work in housing supply elasticity had also been considered for further justification.
Price Inflation Regime
As Graph 5 and Table 3 show, house prices rose exponentially during the 1980s bubble, while in the 2000s case they slowly moved into a period of disinflation (lower annual rate of increase). The precise relationship of these price direction regimes (exponential inflation or disinflation) to the end regime scenarios and to bubble length are discussed and justified in section 8.0. Meanwhile, in simple terms, the findings reported in appendix A and section 8.0 show that if house prices move into a price disinflation regime (ceteris paribus), this will extend the time needed for affordability (demand) to deteriorate and thus to reach a critical value that denotes the end of the bubble. Thus, under such a disinflationary price regime, the bubble is expected to last longer than in the case of exponential house price inflation.
Conversely, if the price direction is exponential (ceteris paribus), then less time would needed for affordability (demand) to reach the critical point at which the end of the bubble is denoted than in the case of price disinflation. In summary, as Diagram 1.0 in appendix A indicates, exponential house price inflation is related to the probability of the sudden growth-end regime which denotes shorter length, while the slow disinflation of prices within a bubble is associated with the disinflation growthend regime, which in turn indicates longer length. It is worth noting that Table 3 indicates a clear positive correlation between bubble length and the magnitude of price inflation. Scott (1996) and Fraser (1993) clearly conclude that the property boom in the late 1980s was 'killed' as a result of the sharp rise of interest rates to 15% in October 1989. Thus, as the theory and the case study suggest, a sudden and large rise in interest rates could kill housing booms in a very sudden way through its negative effect on affordability-demand, while a slight and gradual increase in interest rates could extend a housing boom for a longer period. As section 8.0 concludes and Diagram 1.0 in appendix A indicates, a sudden increase in interest rates (ceteris paribus) would rapidly push up mortgage expenses and as a result accelerate the move towards the critical point marking the end of the bubble. Hence, the lifespan of the bubble would be minimised. The comparison allows us to conclude that if in the case of the 2000s bubble, interest rates had risen suddenly and by a large amount annually, rather than gradually as indicated in Graph 6, then all other things being equal, affordability would have deteriorated more rapidly and hence a bubble of shorter length would have been expected. Conversely, in the 1980s case, if interest rates had risen gradually as they did in the 2000s bubble, the opposite effects would have been expected to occur. It is worth clarifying that our theory ignores the effects of a reduction in interest rates on bubble length. The reasoning is that if all other factors remain constant, any decline in interest rates would affect bubble length equally for each growth-end regime (i.e. a drop in interest rates would increase the lifespan of the bubble in each growth-end regime). With a view to justifying further the above-mentioned relationship, we have attempted to fit the findings of Glaeser et al. (2008) to our analysis, although their findings are related to the metropolitan level of the US housing market. Glaeser et al. (2008) found that the more (price) elastic the supply, the more rapid the unravelling of the bubble and hence the shorter its length. As Graph 3 shows, there were more private sector housing completions in terms of both nominal and scale values (more elastic) during the 1980s bubble than that of the 2000s. This was also well indicated in the Kuenzel and Bjornbak (2008) study. By applying the findings of Glaeser et al. (2008) to the 1980s and 2000s cases, it can be added that the 1980s bubble was shorter not only due to the combination of the exponential increase in house prices and the sudden and large increase in interest rates, but also because of the slightly more elastic supply in the 1980s case, and vice versa for the 2000s.
Section summary
First of all, the above analysis identifies two principal ways in which a housing bubble can stop growing (before the bust): a sudden end to growth and a disinflation growth-end regime. It was shown that the growth-end regime of a housing bubble has a strong relationship with its length. According to the case study analysis, this effect accounts for a difference of two years, for example. A housing bubble that it is destined to end in slow disinflation is more likely to last longer than if it were expected to end in a sudden crash. As the Diagram 1.0 in Appendix A and the findings in section 8.0 indicate, for a bubble to end with a sudden crash a number of conditions must be met. Annual house prices must increase exponentially; interest rates must increase suddenly (and by a large amount annually), in order to cause the direction to move relatively quickly towards the critical value that marks the end; and housing supply must be elastic, to cause the bubble to unravel quickly (Glaeser et al. 2008) . Conversely, for a bubble to end in slow disinflation, property prices must undergo an (initial) increase, followed by slow disinflation; interest rates must increase gradually and stably, in order to increase the time taken to reach the critical point that implies the end; and housing supply must be relatively inelastic, to prevent the quick unravelling of the bubble.
Nevertheless, we cannot conclude from this study which growth-end regime should be regarded as normal for bubbles and what precisely is the time lag for these regimes. Finally, this section argues that the total magnitude of price inflation within a bubble can be partly related to its length. Despite the above conclusion, the main question that naturally arises is: whether and how are affordability benchmarks relevant to bubble length and thus to end regime?
Defining housing affordability
In simple terms, housing affordability implies the ability to afford housing, but any attempt to define it precisely beyond this point becomes slippery (Linneman and Megbolugbe 1992) . The vague nature of affordability is well captured by Quigley and Raphael (2004) : ''Affordability…jumbles together in a single term a number of disparate issues: the distribution of housing prices, the distribution of housing quality, the distribution of income, the ability of households to borrow…and the choices that people make about how much housing to consume relative to other goods. This mixture of issues raises difficulties in interpreting even basic facts about housing affordability''. However, MacLennan and Williams (1990) offer a clear definition of housing affordability as being "concerned with securing some given standard of housing (or different standard) at a price or a rent which does not impose, in the eyes of some third party (usually the government) an unreasonable burden on household incomes". Alternatively put, affordability implies the ability of households to meet the costs of housing without imposing limitations on living costs (Stone 1993) . Freeman et al. (1997, p.2) state that "housing affordability concentrates on the relationship between housing expenditure and household income and defines a (relative or absolute) standard in terms of that income above which housing is regarded as unaffordable".
House-Price-to-Income Ratio
The house-price-to-income ratio is the basic affordability measure for housing in a given region or country. It is the ratio of median or average house prices to the median or average familial disposable income (annual) and can be expressed as a percentage or as years of income (Messah and Kigige 2011) . This approach provides a measure of local or national housing expenditure relative to local ability to pay (Himmelberg et al. 2005) . Similarly, Ndubueze (2009) reports that this measurement technique specifies the level of the average free market price of a dwelling unit in relation to the average annual household income. According to Flood (2001) , ratios of 3 to 5 are regarded as normal and therefore are the "best measure of pressure on the housing market", while Reed and Wu (2010) note that the accepted affordability standard itself is normally 3.0. Nevertheless, for each market there are different rules of thumb and the interpretation of house-price-to-income results is difficult because the ratio ignores tax, changes in housing quality, mortgage interest rates and down payments (Hancock 1993; Freeman et al. 1997; Lerma and Reeder 1987; Ndubueze 2009 ).
Debt-to-income ratio (cost of mortgage)
Under the housing cost approach, the debt-to-income or debt burden ratio is the ratio of mortgage payments to disposable income. A core element of this indicator, which measures total home ownership costs, is that it calculates mortgage payments as a percentage of a typical household's monthly (pre-tax) income. If the ratio rises too far above what is regarded as normal, households become increasingly dependent on rising property values to service their debt (Messah and Kigige 2011; Gan and Hill 2009) . Simply put, debt-to-income ratio considers the ability of households to repay their mortgage liabilities (Tsai 2013; Gan and Hill 2009) . A rule of thumb is that 25% (or sometimes 30% and higher) of household monthly income being spent on housing costs is considered affordable and suitable (Ndubueze 2009 ).
Affordability datasets
Data on UK house-price-to-earnings ratios at a national level since April 1983 are available from the Halifax on a monthly basis and we have converted these to annual data, based on the average figure per calendar year. The Halifax methodology is based on the standardized average house price and the national mean full-time earnings for a man. As to the cost of mortgage (debt-burden-ratio), the Nationwide provides quarterly data on mortgage payments as a percentage of mean take-home pay since 1983 Q1, which we have again converted to annual data, based on the average figure per calendar year. This measures the initial mortgage payment as a percentage of mean take-home pay for first-time buyers at a national level, using new lending interest rates for a loan of 90% of the typical first-time buyer house price.
Control Charts (Shewhart)
This study makes use of control charts for both affordability datasets. First of all there is a need to set appropriately the three key control lines: the midline (average), upper confidence limit (UCL) and lower confidence limit (LCL). The control charts are used to detect the process variability of these datasets over the period 1983-2012. The normal theory suggests that within 3 sigma we can expect 99.73% of future points from an in-control process (between UCL and LCL) to lie inside the control chart limits and 0.27% to lie outside the control limits. For this paper the changes are considered normal if they fall within the area defined by the midline ±3σ and abnormal if they fall above the UCL and thus above +3σ. In order to apply the individual control charts, we assume that the values of the selected variables are normally distributed. The control limits for the individual control charts were found using the following equations (Montgomery 2005 , cited in Walker 2008 ) and were calculated using SPSS.
6.5 The significance of housing affordability benchmarks to housing investment As the economic literature suggests, housing bubbles are unsustainable price increases or overvalued houses compared to the fundamental value, which by nature cannot be precisely determined. According to Case and Shiller (2003) Dolphin and Griffith (2011) McCarthy and Peach (2004) , affordability indices can be used to assess house prices and therefore to identify unsustainable price levels (regimes) within housing markets, since the ability to purchase a house depends on earnings (demand). On this basis, affordability benchmarks can be effectively used to monitor the self-occupancy demand (ability to purchase) rather than the investment-motivated demand (speculation). The self-occupancy demand reflects the long-term investment and depends on household's earnings while the investment-motivated demand denotes the short-term and is driven by expectations of future capital gains (Tsai 2013 , Case and Shiller 2003 , Malpezi and Watcher 2005 . Consequently the affordability measurements are significant to housing market as they can be applied to evaluate whether housing prices are 'too high' (Himmelberg et al. (2005) . For example, Tsai (2013) and McCarthy and Peach (2004) clearly state that if the house-price-to-income ratio is relatively high (compared to the long term rate) then households will find both monthly mortgage payments and down payments more difficult to meet (all other things being equal). Thus, self-occupancy demand will decrease, with a consequent downward pressure on house prices over the long term.
The essential characteristic of affordability indices is that they can be equally applied to determine whether house prices are undervalued during recession for example. As Campbell et al. (2011) state, housing becomes least affordable at the beginning of a slump or at the end of a boom, and most affordable during the recovery phase. Therefore, in order to identify whether house prices are undervalued we have to answer the question whether house prices are 'affordable enough' to cause an increase or stabilization within a recession phase for example. Therefore the appropriate answer determining the probability that house prices will change direction, either marking a recovery phase, or continue in the same direction, indicating a recession for example. As the literature clearly suggests, if house prices are affordable enough then we can predict the likely direction of future house prices because affordability denotes higher demand and therefore higher house prices in the long term. Conversely, if house prices are not affordable enough then we can assert that future house prices are likely to deflate in the long term. 
Descriptive statistics and Control charts of UK affordability benchmarks (Empirical Analysis)
How affordability can be relevant to bubble length
We have shown above that the way a housing bubble ends has a strong relationship with its length. We have also explained the significance of housing affordability to housing bubbles and to the property market in general. But how is affordability relevant to bubble length? Irrespective of end regime, affordability can be explanatory in terms of the length of UK housing bubbles. Graph 7 below charts the ability of first-time buyers to repay their mortgages, covering the periods 1986-1990 and 2002-2008, 1990 and 2008 being the years in which the respective bubbles ended. Graph 7 offers a core paradigm for UK housing bubbles. In particular, comparing it with the performance of average house prices during the same years in Graph 4 (5.3 section) reveals that the shapes of the two graphs are almost identical while both of them highlight the time lag of two years. But what justifies the time lag?
The critical (technical) point for both cases in Control Chart 2.0 is the rate:
(+) 44.05 % Of mortgage payment as a percentage of the mean take home pay.
As the control chart 2.0 (see 7.0 section) suggests, when this rate went above UCL (µ + 3σ), i.e. 44.05% in both bubble cases, the housing bubble stopped growing and in consequence house prices declined in order to meet normal levels of affordability (µ). At that level, households realised that buying a house or taking a mortgage was no longer affordable and therefore the bubble came to an end (stops growing). The 2000s housing bubble lasted longer than the earlier one of the late 1980s. The best explanation for this is that in the recent case, house prices were slowly disinflating (increasing more slowly than in the 1980s, as Graphs 4 and 5 and Table 3 show, all else being equal) and therefore more time was needed for affordability to reach the critical point of (+) 44.05 % at which affordability is historically diminished. An additional explanation for the extended period of the later bubble is the lower nominal interest rates that prevailed in that case. The data on the debt burden (percentage mortgage payments) takes into account interest rate values.
As Graph 6 shows, nominal interest rates in the 2000s were lower than in the 1980s and most importantly were increased gradually and in small scale rather than suddenly and in large scale as in the late 1980s (see section 5.5.2), causing a greater affordability illusion (all else being equal) and resulting in further extension of the bubble length (more time was needed for affordability to reach the critical point).
Conversely, the fact that the 1980s bubble was shorter than that of the 2000s relies on two factors: the sudden and in large scale increase in interest rates and the fact that house prices were rising exponentially, as a result of which affordability was moving faster towards the critical point of (+) 44.05 % (other things being equal).
Graph 7: First-time buyers' mortgage payments as a percentage of mean take-home pay, 1986-1990 and 2002-2008, --(1980s), -(2000s) 9.0 Can housing affordability indices be used to monitor investment decisionmaking?
In order to identify whether housing affordability is indicative of UK housing investment, it is useful to review the affordability indices. This section uses two approaches to analyse UK housing market performance. The first compares the historic average ratios of house prices to income and debt-burden ratio with those of the bubble years. It then examines the relevance of these results to long-term investment. The second involves the interpretation of the control chart result as to whether these values can also be used to provide solid investment theory. Again, the analysis is limited here to the period 1983 to 2012. First of all it must be highlighted that the debt burden ratio can be more relevant to investment decision-making than HP-to-income ratio. For instance, the former takes into account more factors, such as the expenses on the initial mortgage payment (interest rates), while the latter ignores the parameters associated with mortgage expenses. This becomes evident in both of the Shewhart individual control limits, as the debt burden ratio (Control Chart 2.0) provided equal warnings in both bubblebusts, while HP-to-income ratio (Control Chart 1.0) showed less explanatory power. Furthermore, the Table 5 in Shapiro-Wilk test of normality reports that the p value of HP-to-income ratio is less than 0.05 and therefore the null hypothesis that the HP-to income sample came from a normal distribution is rejected. However, in the case of debt-burden ratio the p value indicates that this sample came from a normal distribution (as the p value is well above 0.05). Thus the null hypothesis is accepted. This is an additional explanation that contributes to the conclusion that the debtburden ratio is more explanatory than the house-price-to-income ratio since control charts are constructed based on the assumption that the sample is normally distributed.
Previous studies suggest variability of affordability indices between different markets; each market has different values for what is considered affordable (Reed and Wu 2010) . It is assumed that the average rates for the affordability measures under study are regarded as the accepted affordability standard for the UK housing market. Therefore, as the average values of Table 4 (see section 7.0) and control charts shows, the HP-to-income ratio of 4.05 and the debt burden ratio of 33.22% are considered to be acceptable affordability values. Within the bubble years, both of the ratios were well above their long-term averages, a situation that in the past has often been followed by periods in which real and nominal house prices have fallen. Generally speaking, house-price-to-income ratios and debt-to-income ratios below their longterm averages, that is < 4.05 and < 33.22 % respectively, were applicable for periods when housing investment showed excessive capital appreciation prospects. In general, affordability indices moved in line with the phases of the housing market. For example, according to the Nationwide (2013), UK average nominal house prices began to recover early in 1996, for the first time since the crash of 1990. During that timeframe (i.e. 1996), the debt burden ratio reached its historical lowest point of 18.20% (see Table 4 ), little more than half of the long-term average, thus validating the Tsai (2013) self-correction pattern in house prices.
Despite the above incomplete theory, control charts can provide better estimations and better rules of thumb as to investment in the UK residential market. Our study suggests that values of debt-burden ratio above UCL (see Control Chart 2) constitute warnings of an impending UK housing crash (out-of-control values). This can been clearly justified by the fact that between 1983 and 2012 this rule was violated only four times. The first was in 1989, the last year of the bubble that signalled the crash, then the second in 1990, the first crash year at which the debtburden ratio would plausibly have exceeded the UCL. The third and four times were the years 2007 and 2008, when the situation was the same as in 1989 and 1990. These results are in line with the Campbell et al. (2011) statement that housing becomes least affordable at the beginning of a slump or at the end of a boom, and most affordable during the recovery phase.
It is no coincidence that when the debt burden ratio (Control Chart 2) went beyond +3σ form the midline, that is above 44.05%, the UK housing market entered the last bubble year in each case and signalled the beginning of a crash. Following this logic, the critical point of 44.05% of income being spent on mortgage payments was considered a core sign of unaffordable house prices. However, the debt-burden ratio is useful not only for providing advice in terms of when to exit the UK property market, but mostly for guiding investments in terms of when to enter the UK housing market. For instance, a good rule of thumb is that market participants should focus on entering when the debt-burden ratio is between midline and LCL, i.e. between 22.38% (LCL) and 33.21% (midline), thus being in a better position to enjoy future capital appreciation. Although it is inadequate to judge from a single indicator (debt-burden ratio) whether housing affordability can be used to monitor housing investment in the UK, the same peak points of house-price-to-income ratio (Control Chart 1) contribute to this conclusion. Interestingly, the dynamic conclusions that can be drawn from the application of control charts in related research fields are well noted by Shen et al (2005) and Hou (2009).
Conclusion
The behaviour of house prices, housing bubbles and optimal investment timing have long been of interest. The findings presented in this paper are the product of a combined statistical, technical-graphical and case study analysis. The methodology centres on cross-case analysis of the last two UK housing bubbles, using research methods such as literature review, historical analysis, regression-correlation analysis, normality tests and quality control charts.
Our study suggests that when mortgage payments of first time buyers reach values above the upper confidence limit of (+) 44.05 % of their average household net income, this is a core sign that house price levels are unaffordable, a situation that in the past has often been followed by periods in which real and nominal UK house prices have fallen. In other words, this is the rate at which the bubble length stops growing. However, this conclusion is highly related with the relationship of growthend regimes to bubble's length. The findings reveal that the way a housing bubble is predetermined to end will affect the overall length of the phenomenon. If it ends with a sudden crash it will be shorter that if it had ended in slow disinflation. This level of length gap is justified mainly by the acceleration rate of house prices and the way interest rates are changed. Theoretically for a bubble to end with a sudden crash a number of conditions must be met. Annual house prices must increase exponentially; interest rates must increase suddenly (and by a large amount annually), in order to cause the debt burden ratio to move relatively quickly towards the critical value of (+) 44.05 % . Housing supply must also be elastic, to cause the bubble to unravel quickly (Ermish 1990) . Conversely, for a bubble to end in slow disinflation, property prices must undergo an initial increase followed by slow disinflation. Interest rates must increase gradually and stably in order to increase the time taken to reach the debt burden ratio of critical point (+) 44.05 % . Finally, housing supply must be relatively inelastic to prevent the quick unravelling of the bubble. Nevertheless, from this study, we cannot conclude which growth-end regime should be regarded as normal for bubbles.
This research has also analysed whether housing affordability benchmarks can be a core strategy for investment decision-making within the UK housing sector. First of all we have proofed that the debt-burden ratio is more explanatory and thus relevant in making investment decisions than the house-price-to-income ratio. Most importantly, our findings reveal that the combination of the debt-burden ratio with control charts can provide accurate estimations and better rules of thumb as to investment in the UK residential market. Particularly, our study shows that debtburden ratios beyond (+) 44.05 % are considered to be risky points regarding holding real estate assets while debt-burden ratios between 22.38% and 33.21% are in line with periods where housing investment showed excessive capital appreciation prospects. After all, as Case and Shiller (2004) put it, "the single home market is a market of amateurs with no economic training" and what matters is whether they consider the given house prices affordable. More particularly, what matters is not the changing house price itself, but the ratio of household debt burden to the nominal house price, which is more significant in terms of identifying the different stages within a real estate cycle and the optimal timing for housing investment in the UK.
